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ABSTRACT: According to Bas van Fraassen, a postulated entity which can only be 
detected by means of some instrument should not be considered observable. In this 
paper I argue that (1) this is not correct; (2) someone can be a constructive em-
piricist, adhering to van Fraassen’s famous anti-realist position, even admitting that 
many entities only detectable with a microscope are observable. The case of the 
paramecium, a very well-known single-celled organism, is particularly instructive 
in this respect. I maintain that we actually observe paramecia and not just detect 
them, contrary to what van Fraassen claims. As a matter of fact, even if we can only 
perceive these protozoans by using a microscope, we are in condition to know that 
the relevant counterfactual conditions (like the ones Bueno proposed in 2011) are 
met. Moreover, paramecia satisfy observability and existence criteria proposed by 
Buekens (1999) and Ghins (2005). But admitting paramecia and the like among 
the observables does not threaten Constructive Empiricism, for there will always be 
a line between observables and unobservables on which van Fraassen’s anti-realism 
can rest.
KEYWORDS: Anti-realism, Constructive Empiricism, microscope, observability, obser-
vation, paramecium, van Fraassen.
Constructive Empiricism, the anti-realist position put forward by Bas van 
Fraassen in his seminal book The Scientific Image (1980), crucially relies on 
the viability of the distinction between observable and unobservable. Accord-
ing to him, though, “observation is perception, and perception is something 
possible for us, if at all, without instruments” (van Fraassen 2008: 93), as he 
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has been maintaining for more than thirty years. This stand, of course, signif-
icantly limits the range of the observable, so that viruses and bacteria should 
not be considered as belonging to this category. But this is not correct, or so 
we argue. Furthermore, it is our contention that a constructive empiricist 
can admit that some detections are legitimate instances of observations even 
in cases in which they can only be performed by means of some device and 
that she can do so without any harm for her empiricist position, as both van 
Fraassen and Ian Hacking, ‘the champion of the microscopes’, acknowledge. 
The case of the paramecium is particularly instructive in this respect.
Paramecium is one of the best known single-celled organisms in exist-
ence (supposedly?). Its average size of about 0.25 mm, however, makes it im-
possible to observe this protozoan without a microscope. Anyway, it is said, 
our knowledge of it dates back to Antony van Leeuwenhoek’s first detections, 
at the end of the seventeenth century. Besides, it is extremely common to find 
images of this microorganism in books (especially textbooks) and journals 
and also, quite easily, ‘on Youtube’. Notwithstanding, it is still an object of 
investigation in these days of electronic microscopy.
As a matter of fact, “[its] relatively large size …, for a microorganism, 
and its complex fine structure have made it the organism of choice for in-
numerable morphological and physiological studies” (Hausmann & Allen 
2010: 143–144). There exist, indeed, special culturing and preparation tech-
niques of the paramecia for conventional scanning (SEM) and transmission 
electron microscopy (TEM).
Van Fraassen nevertheless maintains that something is observable if and 
only if it can be perceived without the aid of an instrument and this is not 
the case of the paramecium. What, then, when a high school student in the 
Biology Lab looks through an optical microscope and says that she is seeing 
one of these protozoans? Van Fraassen’s answer is that she is actually postulat-
ing that there exist certain invariant geometric relations among the image, 
the paramecium and her eyes, but in fact she has no guarantee that this is 
the case:
If you say … about the microscope’s images that they are pictures of e.g. para-
mecia, then you are asserting that there are certain invariant geometric relations 
between the object, image, and vantage point. But now you are postulating that 
these relations hold, rather than gathering information about whether that is so. 
(van Fraassen 2001: 160)
The student could not legitimately describe her experience as being an obser-
vation, in other words.
But van Fraassen’s opinion counters a widespread one, almost certainly 
unanimous among scientists and laboratory technicians, about optical mi-
croscopes (and paramecia). Indeed, who would say that the student is wrong 
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in describing her experience as being an observation of a paramecium, apart 
from van Fraassen (and, perhaps, Martin Kusch)? This single-celled organism 
has in fact been detected, with different instruments, for more than three 
centuries.1 Detecting paramecia is extremely common and it is even possible 
to interact with them, so that there exist various preparation techniques of 
a sample, depending on the aim of the microscope user. If the paramecium 
under investigation is still alive, it is possible to follow its movements; but it 
would also be possible to dislocate either the paramecium or the microscope 
itself, in order to obtain different visual angles.
The importance of being able to identify an object from different points 
of view, so that it can be considered observable, was stated by Filip Buekens 
in 1999:
It is crucial to our conception of an observable object that it be the centre of a 
perceptual polygon – it can be perceived or observed from different angles (when 
the observer moves) and remain observable when it moves in space. … It comes 
with our concept of an observable object that it can be observed – identified 
– to be that object from different perceptual angles. The observer must be able 
to place it at the centre of a perceptual polygon. The ‘able’ in ‘observable’ partly 
depends on whether this condition can be fulfilled. The angles of the polygon 
are locations in space from which the observer is able to identify the object as it 
moves in space, or as he moves in that space. (Buekens 1999: 26)2
According to Buekens, microscopic entities cannot be placed at the center of 
a perceptual polygon, as there is only one perceptual angle from which we 
have access to them, the one provided by the instrument. Hence, they are 
not observable. But, we maintain, this is not true of the paramecium (and of 
many other microscopic entities).
This microorganism can be perceived or observed from different angles, 
when the observer moves, and remains observable when it moves in space. 
Contra Buekens, it is therefore possible to say that the paramecium can actu-
ally be placed at the centre of a perceptual polygon. It is not true that we have 
1 Van Fraassen would not deny this, as he admits that we even detect particles (see van 
Fraassen 1980: 17). According to him, to detect is to be distinguished from to observe: “Micro-
scopes, cloud chambers, laser interferometers and other scientific instruments allow us to detect 
entities, but detection has to be carefully distinguished from observation. A look through a mi-
croscope does not allow us to observe directly a paramecium; only to observe an image of a para-
mecium, or to detect a paramecium” (Contessa 2006: 456). See also van Fraassen (2008: 93).
2 This passage is an excerpt from “Observing in a Space of Reasons”, an unpublished 
paper of 1996 (revised in 1999), that could originally be found in Buekens’s page on Tilburg 
University’s website. A new version of it (but with a different title), that dates 2005, was kindly 
sent to me by Professor Buekens in 2013. In an e-mail message of 28 October 2013, he author-
ized citing both 1999 and 2005 (unpublished) versions (“Observing in a Space of Reasons”, in 
its 1996 version, is also cited by van Fraassen in his 2002 book The Empirical Stance).
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only one perceptual angle from which we have access to it, despite this being 
provided by the instrument. Paramecia, then, do satisfy Buekens’s observ-
ability criterion.
And what about their existence? Remember that, as van Fraassen cor-
rectly said, “we can’t see things that don’t exist” (2001: 158). According to the 
ontological criteria proposed by Michel Ghins in 2005, however, paramecia 
do exist. They certainly satisfy the invariance criterion (almost identical to 
Buekens’s one for observability):
There are no such things as naked phenomena and sense data. We perceive 
or observe organized objects and not raw phenomena or data. Objects enjoy, 
among other features, some stability in time; some of their characteristics re-
main the same and exhibit some permanence over long or short periods of time. 
Some objects can be moved in space while retaining, according to what we 
observe, their identity. Or we can move around them, while feeling sure that we 
still perceive the same object. (Ghins 2005: 96)3
The other criterion he talks about, the criterion of presence, is also satisfied 
by the paramecia. As with the pineapple of the example given in his article 
(see 2005: 96), a paramecium is phenomenally present to the subject, at least 
possibly. Borrowing Ghins’s words, we can say that it certainly is rational to 
believe that paramecia exist at some place, even if there are none in front of 
me at this moment; but if I collect a sample of water from the artificial lake 
of the campus and examine it with a microscope, I will be able to see some 
paramecia. “Taking over some traditional terminology, it may be said that 
sensory experience gives content or matter to the object seen or perceived” 
(Ghins 2005: 96).
Sensory content alone is not enough, of course, but, according to Ghins, 
the invariance criterion suffices to complement the one of presence and de-
clare that something exists, when it satisfies both requirements. Ghins would 
say that paramecia exist, then, as they fit the ‘existence criteria’ present in his 
article.
Now, some strenuous advocate of van Fraassen’s position could counter 
that we are trying to attest that a detection of a paramecium performed with 
a microscope is actually an observation by assuming that this microorgan-
ism can really be seen, when using this device. But what we have showed is 
3 This criterion is ontological, while the argument of the perceptual polygon is episte-
mological, but the two appear to be in perfect harmony anyway. As a matter of fact, Buekens 
talks about a relative displacement between the observer and the object (or state of affairs) 
perceived, making it feasible for the subject to keep track of the latter, so that she can feel sure 
that she still perceives the same object (which retains, according to the observer, its identity). 
Metaphysics and epistemology often go ‘hand in hand’ and they certainly do in this case, as 
Ghins suggests (see his 2005: 95).
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that, in the case of the paramecium, a visual experience comes along with 
robust corroborations: it is possible to interfere with the protozoan under 
investigation, it is possible to apply the method of triangulation using other 
instruments (even devices whose construction and functioning are based on 
principles and theories different from the ones governing the construction 
and functioning of the optical microscope), it is possible to compare what is 
seen with an extraordinarily large number of reports, images (drawings and 
pictures) and videos made by other people, we can ask to another person to 
look at the same sample and report what she is seeing, we can compare what 
we are seeing with what is said about paramecia in a Biology textbook, we 
know that the common optical microscope is a reliable device ‘beyond rea-
sonable doubt’, etc.
Moreover, but also as a result of what we have just said, it is possible to 
verify that the detection of paramecia by means of a microscope qualifies as 
a genuine veridical perception, for it satisfies (even changing the perceptual 
angle) the relevant counterfactual conditions, like the ones Otávio Bueno 
proposed in 2011:
(i) Had the scene before our eyes been different (within our cognitive device’s 
sensitivity range), our perceptual experience would have been correspondingly 
different. (ii) Had the scene before our eyes been the same (within our cognitive 
device’s sensitivity range), our perceptual experience would have been corre-
spondingly the same. (Bueno 2011a: 278, our translation)4
The situation seems perfectly akin to observing the Manneken Pis in Bruxel-
les, or any other object that van Fraassen would classify as observable.
We can then be confident that we are observing a paramecium, when 
we detect one by means of an optical microscope, as it is possible to know 
that the relevant counterfactual conditions are satisfied – and to have other 
(robust) corroborations, as in any other case of ordinary observation. When 
we triangulate, besides, we do not make use of the results of triangulation 
to make some kind of inference, as was erroneously suggested by Ian Hack-
ing when he wrote about the use of microscopes (scoring an ‘own goal’ that 
ended up favouring a radical anti-realist position such as van Fraassen’s) (see 
Hacking 1983 and van Fraassen 1985); when we triangulate, we simply ob-
serve.
It is not triangulation alone that corroborates the idea that the action 
performed with a microscope is an observation, though. But van Fraassen 
maintains that this case is essentially similar to detecting a microparticle in 
a cloud chamber, as if in both cases the subject were making an inference, 
4 See also Noë (2003: 94–97) and, for a version of these counterfactual conditionals 
specific for microscopes, Bueno (2011c: 256).
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when this is true only of the second case. Why is that so? An answer is given 
by Kusch (2013: 13): “we cannot empirically investigate the geometrical rela-
tions between the eye and the microscopic image on the one side, and the 
postulated unobservable entity on the other side”. This means that, accord-
ing to Kusch (and van Fraassen), if one says that she is seeing a paramecium, 
when she detects one via a microscope, then this person is inferring or postu-
lating that certain geometrical relations hold, but in fact is in no position to 
know that this is the case, as was said before.
But what prevents the agent from empirically investigating whether 
things really are the way she thinks they are? If the answer is that only by 
performing an unaided act of perception can we claim that we are empirically 
investigating (that something is the case), then the argument is obviously 
circular. That would mean that it is not possible to observe a paramecium by 
using a microscope because something that can only be detected by means 
of some device cannot be detected (perceived) without it. Maybe an empiri-
cal investigation can be performed even by using some device, though. Sara 
Vollmer seems to defend this idea: “instrument-assisted observation can give 
precisely the same kind of experiential information that ordinary observation 
gives about a scene or object” (2000: 362). Van Fraassen does not seem to 
agree, however: “experience can give us information only about what is both 
observable and actual”, he wrote in 1985 (253). An investigation is empiri-
cal only if it is about an actual observable, then. According to van Fraassen 
and Kusch we cannot empirically investigate if there exist certain invariant 
geometric relations among the image, the paramecium and the eyes of the 
observer. This means that we cannot observe the paramecium because it is 
not observable.5 Circularity again.
5 It is a common criticism of van Fraassen’s position that he has never elucidated what 
‘to observe’ means (see Sober (2008: 130–131) and Suppe (1989: 25–30), among others). He 
seems to maintain that the sense in which he uses the verb is the ordinary one (see his 1992: 
18), but Alspector-Kelly correctly replies that: “The claim that we can only see what the hu-
man senses can detect without aid or supplementation of some sort is not a conceptual truth; 
or, if it is, it is far from obvious that it enjoys that status. Nor is the claim obvious from a 
review of intuitive judgments concerning what we can see” (2004: 332). Should van Fraassen 
propose some criteria of observation or observability in support of his claims, then, as others 
have done? This does not seem an option open to him, on pain of incoherence. In fact, he 
defends that “if anyone wants to frame opinions about just what is observable, I would urge 
him to draw on physiology and psychology, and empirical science in general, and not to ask 
philosophers at all” (1992: 20; see also 1980: 57–58). A decade later he added, in a paper with 
Bradley Monton: “for a philosopher to identify the contingent factors in general that consti-
tute observability in general would run precisely counter to van Fraassen’s contention that 
what is observable is an empirical question. Given this view, any such philosophical enterprise 
must end up as either armchair science—worst in the empiricist’s catalog of philosophical 
sins, next to psychologism—or as metaphysics of the same ilk as modal realism” (2003: 412). 
The only open option, then, even for a philosopher, is to rely on science. The problem is, as 
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In view of all this, claiming that the conclusion that we are observing a 
paramecium (by looking through a microscope) nothing more is than a pos-
tulation begs the question, as if that statement were certainly false.6 Moreo-
ver, van Fraassen here seems to be violating the neutrality principle that, in 
such cases, has always considered adequate.7 It is even incoherent, then, his 
assertion that it is false that a detection of a paramecium, mediated by a mi-
croscope, does not represent an instance of observation.
Our opinion is that, on the contrary, this is a clear example of observa-
tion, while it is reasonable, instead, so far, to maintain a policy of neutrality 
in regard to the alleged observations of extrasolar planets that have been an-
nounced during the last five years. Peter Kosso comments that “van Fraassen 
would classify ESPs as observable, on the grounds that a human being in the 
right place could see them with the naked eye” (Kosso 2006: 225, footnote 
1). But this cannot be right, Kosso continues, because it would allow justifi-
cation to rely on unavailable information, as we are obviously not in any posi-
tion to see ESPs with the naked eye (and it is not clear that we will ever be).
The fact that the paramecium is allegedly unobservable, according to 
van Fraassen’s ‘criteria’, while an exoplanet should be considered observable, 
is not of any help in these cases, because our opinion about the observability 
status of an entity cannot establish if our attempt to observe it will be success-
ful or not, of course (particularly when the opinion is controversial).
Frederick Suppe explains, that scientific theories “have nothing to say about what is observ-
able – especially in the anthropocentric ways outlined [by van Fraassen]” (1989: 28). We can 
confidently add that the vast majority of scientists and technicians do not share the opinion 
that observing is only performing an unaided act of detection – not to mention that van Fraas-
sen admits exceptions to this ‘rule’, as in the case of the detection of the moons of Jupiter via 
a telescope, but not when it comes to detecting a paramecium by means of a common optical 
microscope (see 1980: 16; and for a criticism to this stand, see Hanson & Levy 1982: 291). It 
is then clear that, to him, the whole question is not a matter of reliability of the instruments 
used or of the human sensory apparatus (Delehanty suggests it might somehow be, though, 
but adds that this should be made clear by van Fraassen (see 2005: 33–34); Menuge (see 
1995: 61) argues that it should (also) be a matter of reliability of the device used). We can, in 
summary, conclude that van Fraassen’s observable/unobservable crucial distinction is founded 
on a pure semantical postulation/definition, that however seems inappropriate. A different 
characterization of what ‘to observe’ means, that we believe appropriate, has been (succinctly) 
put forward in this paper – together with existence criteria we believe related; but van Fraassen 
is clearly not interested in ontological questions.
6 I thank Professor Otávio Bueno, of the University of Miami, for elucidating, in a recent 
conversation, on the matter of triangulation and on how it is van Fraassen himself who begs 
the question, when charging of postulation the advocates of a ‘realist interpretation’ of the use 
of microscopes.
7 In The Scientific Image, for example, he wrote: “I wish merely to be agnostic about the 
existence of the unobservable aspects of the world described by science” (1980: 72). But he 
appears not to be maintaining an agnostic stance, in the case of the detection of (the allegedly 
unobservable) paramecia by means of a microscope. 
298 Prolegomena 13 (2) 2014
Copies of The Scientific Image, paramecia, extrasolar planets and flying 
horses are all instances of observable entities, or so we claim, as they can be 
observed under appropriate conditions. This has been largely attested in the 
first two cases, for observations of copies of the book van Fraassen wrote in 
1980 and of the mentioned microscopic zoophytes happen all the time in 
the world; in the case of the exoplanets, on the other hand, there still exist 
margins of doubt about they having really been observed; in the case of flying 
horses, finally, the certainty that an observation of one of them has never hap-
pened made van Fraassen declare that they do not exist (see 1980: 15).
Now, there are entities (posited, of course) that he considers unobserva-
ble, like the electrons, which (it is reasonable to think) will never be observed, 
for various reasons, independently of future technological developments. 
There are limits for observability, in other words, despite we having widened 
them a little (or, changing perspective, having got a little closer to them), 
particularly in the last centuries. Bueno says that in the case of certain instru-
ments like the scanning tunneling microscope, for example, we do not know 
if the relevant counterfactual conditions are actually met. He writes: “Even if 
it is possible that the counterfactual conditions are satisfied, it is difficult to 
know that this is, in fact, the case” (Bueno 2011a: 289, our translation).8 As a 
consequence, agnosticism is the most reasonable attitude when we deal with 
the results provided by this instrument.
The internalist requirement – that the subject must be aware, even im-
plicitly or intuitively, of the fact that the relevant counterfactual conditions 
are satisfied – seems to correctly capture what actually happens in ordinary 
observation (aided or not).9 Many instances of aided detection satisfy it and 
rightly qualify as observations; others fail to meet it, as in Bueno’s example, 
and cannot be considered as instances of observation. The argument that any 
attempt to divide ‘theory’ and ‘observation’ would be arbitrary, because of an 
alleged continuity between (unaided) perception and (aided) detection of any 
8 Bueno claims “that it is at least a necessary requirement to have a certain piece of 
knowledge that I should be able to support it if challenged” (Bueno 2011b: 189); therefore, 
as “the internalist would insist, one needs to know that the process is indeed reliable in order 
to be in a position to defend knowledge claims that emerge from this process against potential 
challenges” (Bueno 2011b: 190). See also Bueno (2011a: 281–282).
9 By appealing to the satisfaction of the relevant counterfactual conditions, in fact, it is 
also possible to avoid classifying cases of ‘veridical hallucinations’ as instances of perception, 
as it should be; but not to avoid classifying as such cases of ‘abnormal forms of prosthetic or 
artifical perception’, as, on the contrary, Alva Noë does (incorrectly) in his “Causation and 
Perception: The Puzzle Unravelled” (2003). Adding the internalist requirement, on the other 
hand, correctly blocks this possibility. The aim here is not to discuss Noë’s position in detail, 
though, but just to mention another argument that should favour our characterization of ob-
servation over van Fraassen’s one, that doesn’t seem to be of any help when it gets to discussing 
cases of ‘veridical hallucinations’ and the like.
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kind and the consequent lack of a criterion allowing us to trace an objective 
boundary – as in the classic article by Grover Maxwell, “The ontological sta-
tus of theoretical entities” (1962) – is then refuted by the requirements that 
an action has to meet in order to be classified as an observation.10
It seems, in sum, that observation is actually a matter of meeting the 
relevant counterfactual conditions (and of the agent being somehow aware 
that this is the case) rather than a matter of unaided perception or (worse) of 
aided detection of something that could, at least in principle, be perceived 
‘directly’ (without the help of any device), as van Fraassen maintains (see his 
1980: 16). A consequence is that the dividing line lies somewhere different 
from where van Fraassen thinks it does. But there is one and it is principled, 
as he requires it to be.11
Admitting paramecia among the observables, therefore, would not rep-
resent the first step of a slippery slope that would annihilate Constructive 
Empiricism. The outcome would ‘simply’ be, instead, a displacement of the 
observable/unobservable line. Hacking, who notoriously contended that mi-
croscopes allow us to commit with the existence of the so-called ‘microscopic 
reality’, is aware of the fact that such a displacement would not affect van 
Fraassen’s philosophical position:
Imagine a reader initially attracted by van Fraassen, and who thought that ob-
jects seen only with light microscopes do not count as observable. The reader 
could change his mind, and admit such objects into the class of observable 
entities. This would still leave intact the main philosophical positions of van 
Fraassen’s anti-realism. (Hacking 1983: 208)
It is a common opinion that a line dividing observables and unobservables 
will always exist. Because of this, van Fraassen considers that in the (unlikely) 
10 Something along the lines of Maxwell’s argument can be found in Feyerabend (1960: 
18) and Mitsuo Nixon (2004), but it seems that, for them, observation is just a matter of train-
ing the observer. Alspector-Kelly has an argument similar to Maxwell’s too, but based on the 
idea that “what does matter, as it should – especially to the empiricist – is the epistemological 
value of the transaction, that is, the reliability of the causal process and fidelity of the percep-
tual experience that is its product” (2004: 346). What counts for van Fraassen, on the contrary, 
is just that the transaction be or can somehow be performed using no instruments (without 
modifying the observer’s physiology, though, as Muller warns (2005: 67–69 and 88)). Being 
so, “van Fraassen’s reluctance to extend the concept of seeing beyond naked-eye vision is (…) 
epistemically unfounded” (Alspector-Kelly 2004: 346). We agree with Alspector-Kelly, who 
goes on saying, about Maxwell’s continuity argument: “Are there any entities that lie, in prin-
ciple, beyond the reach of perceptual experience? I share Maxwell’s reluctance to prejudge the 
issue, but we can identify the reasons why there might be” (2004: 348). Our opinion is that 
there are in fact entities that lie beyond the reach of perceptual experience (Alspector-Kelly is 
not sure about this) and that the above requirements correctly capture the reasons why it is so 
(provided these entities exist).
11 Personal communication (Belo Horizonte, Brazil, 2007).
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event of admitting paramecia and the like among the observables, this con-
cession to the critics of his orthodox position could even represent a lost bat-
tle, but ‘in a war he believes he can win’, as has reaffirmed in his last book:
What about the observable/unobservable distinction then? The main points of 
our discussion are not much affected by just where precisely the line is drawn. 
I draw the line this side of things only appearing in optical microscope images, 
but won’t really mind very much if you take this option only, for example, 
for the electron microscope. After all, optical microscopes don’t reveal all that 
much of the cosmos, no matter how veridical or accurate their images are. 
The empiricist point is not lost if the line is drawn in a somewhat different way 
from the way I draw it. The point would be lost only if no such line drawing 
was to be considered relevant to our understanding of science. (van Fraassen 
2008: 110)
The acknowledgement that some ‘aided’ detections are genuine instances of 
observation and, as a consequence, that entities only detectable by means of 
some device are in fact observable will not ‘keep van Fraassen awake at night’, 
then.12 Someone can be a constructive empiricist even not agreeing with him 
on the matter of the so-called ‘observation instruments’. Unless she believes 
that electrons are observable, of course.
Not only is it our contention that a line separating what is observable 
by us (even with the aid of some device) from what is unobservable actually 
exists, however, but also that it is possible to think that technological progress 
is taking us closer to identifying it and not, as van Fraassen maintains, that 
by admitting the use of microscopes and the like we are shifting the line. 
There are limits to the possibility to know that the relevant counterfactual 
conditions are satisfied, as Bueno said, and they are independent of the state 
of the art of scientific technology. They depend, actually, on “our limitations, 
qua human beings”, as van Fraassen wrote (1980: 17). As a matter of fact, 
“what is observable … is a function of facts about us qua organisms in the 
world” (van Fraassen 1980: 57–58). Microscopes and other devices, by let-
ting us acquire some knowledge about the ‘microscopic reality’, do not shift 
any border. What they do, instead, is allowing us to ‘catch a glimpse’ of our 
constitutive limitations and to get to know something more about where the 
boundary crucial for Constructive Empiricism lies.
12 Even if it might be said that, strictly speaking, his anti-realism will not survive 
this admission, as it would be false that we should be agnostic about the existence of 
paramecia and the like.
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